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1 
I INTRODUCTION 
Indian Companies' ADRs/GDRs Premiums, Discounts for July 5 
2005-07-04 18:30 (New York) 
 
     July 5 (Bloomberg) -- The following table of American and global depositary receipts of 
Indian companies compares their closing prices with the most recent closes in local trading. 
Price adjustments are based on a currency value of 43.55 rupee per dollar, along with the 
number of shares per ADR or GDR.  
      
                     ADR/GDR                  Local     Local  ADR/GDR  Shares/  
Company              Ticker  Close  % Chg    Equiv.     Close   % Prem   ADR/GDR 
Dr Reddy's           RDY     17.10  +1.06    744.62    775.90    -4.03       1.0 
HDFC Bank            HDB     47.89  +2.97    695.12    631.70   +10.04       3.0 
ICICI Bank           IBN     22.00  +0.69    479.00    429.15   +11.61       2.0 
Infosys Technologies INFY    76.47  -1.46  3,329.89  2,394.85   +39.04       1.0 
MTNL                 MTE      6.58  +3.95    143.26    121.85   +17.57       2.0 
Ranbaxy Labs         RBXD    24.70  -0.04  1,075.56  1,078.40    -0.26       1.0 
Reliance Industries  RIGD    29.53  +1.48    642.94    643.85    -0.14       2.0 
Satyam Computers     SAY     26.40  +1.54    574.79    511.00   +12.48       2.0 
State Bank of India  SBID    41.75  +0.60    909.00    710.60   +27.92       2.0 
Tata Motors          TTM      9.70  +0.21    422.39    426.75    -1.02       1.0 
Wipro                WIT     20.58  -1.34    896.16    744.00   +20.45       1.0 
      
Companies are listed based on a market capitalization of more than $1 billion, average daily 
trading of at least 1,000 ADRs or GDRs during the last three months, and a history of 
trading at least four days a week. 
 
      
--New Delhi newsroom, 91-11-5179-2020 
 
11 Indian companies have their ADRs listed on the stock exchanges in the US. 
The above article provides a list of the companies with ADRs listed in US, along with 
data regarding ADR prices in US, the underlying equity share prices in the Indian stock 
markets and the premium at which these ADRs are trading in the US stock markets vis-à-
vis price of the underlying equity in Indian stock market.  
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Exhibit I a
Company Listing in US stock Markets
Infosys Technologies Mar-99
Wipro Oct-00
ICICI Bank Mar-00
Satyam Computers May-01
HDFC Bank Jul-01
MTNL Jan-98  
We observe that in case of Infosys, Wipro, State Bank of India and MTNL the 
premium is substantial (> 15%) while in the case ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank and Satyam 
Computers, the ADR premium is a material figure. What is pertinent is the fact that these 
premiums are not a one time aberration but have been in existence for a long time (in 
case of Infosys, the premium of >30% can be traced back to its listing in the US in March 
1999). Most of the ADRs have been listed in the US for some time but continue to trade 
at premiums. Exhibit I a indicates when some of the Indian companies were listed in the 
US. 
 
If we accept the notion of efficiency of stock markets (no matter to what degree), 
it seems improbable that such significant premiums can be allowed to exist for long by 
arbitrageurs. The very fact that this data is being reported daily on Bloomberg means that 
the ADR premiums are public knowledge. 
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Exhibit I b
Economy # of stocks Date
Average ADR 
premium Maximum Minimum
India 11 5-Jul-05 12.15% 39.04% -4.03%
Germany 18 5-Jul-05 0.26% 0.96% -1.58%
China (listed Hong Kong)* 15 5-Jul-05 0.15% 2.44% -1.76%
South Korea 11 6-Jul-05 1.32% 6.22% -1.41%
Hong Kong 17 4-Jul-05 -0.14% 2.22% -2.59%
Taiwan 13 4-Jul-05 1.95% 12.51% -2.70%
Singapore 4 5-Jul-05 -0.14% 1.35% -1.77%
Australia 19 4-Jul-05 0.41% 3.12% -1.35%
UK 48 5-Jul-05 1.23% 4.48% -5.35%
*excludes Yanzhou Coal, a significant outlier  
To check whether this phenomenon is peculiar to Indian ADRs only, we analyzed 
the premiums at which ADRs of other countries trade in the US. We included ADRs from 
Germany, South Korea, China (shares listed in Hong Kong), Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Australia and UK in our sample. The results are presented in Exhibit I b. 
 
We observe that Indian ADRs not only trade at a relatively higher premium 
compared to other ADRs, but also at a significant premium in absolute terms. The highest 
ADR premium for India is 39% (Infosys). In fact, apart from Taiwan, ADRs of countries 
other than India trade at negligible premiums. This makes the phenomenon of Indian 
ADR premiums remarkable. 
  
The phenomenon of existence of ADR premiums can be compared to at least 3 
other cases in contemporary finance, viz. 
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• Royal Dutch/ Shell group conundrum – Royal Dutch Shell group was a joint 
venture between Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (RDP) of the Netherlands and 
the Shell Transport and Trading Company plc (STT) of UK in the ratio of 60:40. 
Even though RDP and STT had rights to cash flows of Royal Dutch Shell in 
60:40 ratio (and no other assets), their share prices were never in 60:40 ratio i.e. 
cash flows with similar risk-return characteristics were valued differently by same 
set of investors. 
• The closed end mutual fund puzzle – Closed end funds trade at a discount to their 
NAVs. This is a puzzle since prima facie there is no reason why the market price 
for a closed-end fund is usually different from the current value of the portfolio 
held by the fund, or its net asset value (NAV). In this regard, we would take a 
look at the closed end India Fund (IFN), its price versus NAV in Section IV 
(Investigating ADR premiums). 1 
• 3Com/Palm case – In September 1999, 3Com announced its intentions to carve 
out Palm Computing, and subsequently spin it off. When Palm started traded 
publicly in March 2000, the market cap of Palm was $53.4 billion, much higher 
than 3Com’s $28.5 billion value, even though 3Com still owned 94% of Palm and 
also other assets. Based on 3Com’s 94% ownership, 3Com’s stake in Palm was 
worth approximately $50 billion, giving substantial negative value to 3Com’s 
other assets, an almost perfect violation of the law of one price. 2 
                                                 
1 “Asymmetric Information and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle” - Oh & Ross 1993 
“Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle” – Lee, Shleifer & Thaler 1990 
 
2 “The Valuation and Market Rationality of Internet Stock Prices” – Ofek & Richardson, 2001 
“The Parent Company Puzzle – When is the whole less than one of its parts?” – Cornell & Liu, 2000 
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Research Objectives 
 
This research aims to analyze the continued existence of premiums on Indian 
ADRs over the last 3-4 years and investigate the  reasons for the same. If any security, 
carrying the same risk-reward characteristics, trades at two different prices in different 
markets, the arbitrageurs will soon step in to take advantage of the situation, till the time 
the security trades at one price, across all markets. That has not happened in the case of 
these Indian ADRs.  
 
The paper looks at the following possible sources of the premium: 
 
1. Legal / Institutional: Laws regarding capital account transactions in India, 
including the rules and exact procedures for investment by foreign nationals in Indian 
securities market and repatriation of those funds. If the foreign nationals have limited or 
no access to Indian stock markets, it is probable that ADRs in the US markets are valued 
under different assumptions compared to the valuation of underlying equity in the Indian 
stock markets (which is, to an extent, same as saying that the two securities have two 
different bodies of investors, with different expectations and assumptions).  
2. Liquidity: Measuring the relative liquidity of ADRs in the US to the underlying 
stock in India, which may be a partial cause of the premiums. In case the liquidity of 
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ADRs is higher, the ADRS would carry certain liquidity premium vis-à-vis equity listed 
on the Indian stock markets. 
3. Risk preferences: The investors may assign different risk-reward characteristics to 
Indian equities and Indian ADRs on account of currency risk, repatriation risk or risk of 
procedural delays in security transactions in India. This may also result in a premium on 
ADRs.  
 
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. Section II focuses on 
analyzing the ADR premiums, their trends and correlations with concerned stock markets 
and securities. Section III attempts to delineate the differences between institutional 
frameworks that govern capital account transactions in India and three vibrant economies 
in world markets – Germany, Hong Kong and South Korea. We attempt to analyze 
whether these differences may be causing ADR premiums. Section IV covers an 
investigation of the likely causes of ADR premiums. 
Section V summarizes our findings and analyses. 
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II ANALYSIS OF ADR PREMIUMS OVER TIME 
This section divided into two parts. Part A is aimed at analyzing the trends in 
ADR premiums and the movement in ADR premium levels in recent years. Part B 
explores the relationship between returns on ADRs with the returns on the underlying 
equity, and with the returns on broad market indices (viz S&P 500 and the Bombay 
Sensex in India). The analyses in this section would help us put the issue of ADR 
premiums in perspective, against a backdrop of long terms trends in ADR premiums, and 
the relationship of ADRs with underlying equity and the US and Indian stock markets. 
A. Trend Analysis of the ADR Premiums 
We have analyzed the ADR premiums trend over a period of last 5 years. The 
results are detailed in Exhibit II a. 
 
Graphically, we present Exhibit II b - d, the ADRs with relatively the highest 
premiums over time among Indian ADRs.  
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Exhibit II a
ADR Stock Ticker 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
Dr Reddy's RDY 7% 2% 1% 3% 2% 3%
HDFC Bank HDB 5% 8% 14% 21% 12% 12%
ICICI Bank IBN 3% 13% 16% 15% 11% 12%
Infosys INFY 57% 61% 46% 49% 36% 50%
MTNL MTE 5% 1% 1% 21% 15% 9%
Ranbaxy Lab. RBXD 13% 8% 9% 2% 1% 7%
Reliance Industries RIGD 38% 38% 37% 43% 31% 37%
Satyam Computers SAY 15% 10% 24% 45% 21% 23%
SBI SBID 8% 18% 29% 31% 26% 22%
Tata Motors TTM 0 0 0 1% 0% 0%
Wipro WIT 2% 3% 12% 37% 27% 16%
Average 14% 15% 17% 24% 16% 17%  
Exhibit II b
Indian Technology Companies 
ADR premiums over time
Wipro
Infosys
Satyam Computers
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
We observe that ADRs in information technology sectors have historically traded 
at premiums. We also observe that Infosys exhibits the highest premium among Indian 
ADRs (almost 60% in 2002), but the premium is trending down and is almost half of its 5 
year high in 2005. In fact, currently the Infosys ADR premium is around 17%, which 
certainly is remarkable given the fact that it is a historic low. Wipro and Satyam 
Computers, in contrast, had low ADR premiums initially, peaked at 35%-45% in 2004 
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and trended down to over 20% in 2005. Currently, Wipro trades at 24% ADR premium 
while Satyam trades at 16% premium. 
Exhibit II c
Indian Banking Companies
ADR premiums over time
HDFC Bank
ICICI Bank
SBI
0%
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10%
15%
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30%
35%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
The banking sector of India has shown continued strength, and it is, therefore, no 
surprise that the bellwethers of Indian banking sector, State Bank of India (SBI), ICICI 
Bank and HDFC Bank, have shown continuous increase in ADR premiums till 2004. In 
2005, however, premiums on all three ADRs has declined significantly. Currently, these 
banking sector ADRs trade at 13%-15% premiums. 
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Exhibit II d
Other Indian Companies
ADR premiums over time
MTNL
Ranbaxy Lab.
Reliance Industries
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
Of the remaining ADRs, in our sample, Reliance Industries has maintained the 
most stable premium of 30-40% in last 5 years, but in 2006, the premium is down to 
<5%. While MTNL ADR premium declined to almost 0% by 2003, Ranbaxy’s hovered 
around low teens and high single digits in 2001-03. In the last two years (i.e. 2004 & 
2005) MTNL ADR premiums have shot up to over 15%, while Ranbaxy’s declined 
precipitously to almost zero.1 Two other ADRs in our sample, Dr Reddy’s 
(Pharmaceuticals) and Tata Motors (Automobiles) have shown negligible premiums 
(<5%) for the period under study. 
 
Across the board, however Indian ADRs have shown a decline in ADR premiums 
over the period 2001-2005. The simple average for 11 ADRs has declined from 2004 
high of 24% to 16% in 2005 and was only 11% in February 2006. 
 
                                                 
1 MTNL and Ranbaxy recently had their GDRs converted to ADRs, so the data relates partly to GDRs 
and partly to ADRs. Reliance (RIGD) is a GDR. 
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A trend analysis of all 11 ADRs has been conducted. The results shown a clear 
downtrend in ADR premiums over time, which indicates that the cause of ADR 
premiums is somehow being removed, or corrected, if you will, over time.  
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Trend Analysis of ADR premiums over 2001-2005  
(Please refer to Appendix V for trend analysis of the entire sample of Indian ADRs) 
 
ICICI Bank (IBN) 
 
Month
Ib
n
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
-0.05
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 65.6312
MAD 0.0520
MSD 0.0038
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Ibn
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = -0.0130895 + 0.00986889*t - 0.000138528*t**2
 
 
 
Infosys Technologies (INFY) 
 
Month
In
fy
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 15.0745
MAD 0.0697
MSD 0.0075
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Infy
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = 0.568490 + 0.00168048*t - 0.000100089*t**2
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Satyam Computers (SAY) 
 
Month
Sa
y
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 62.8986
MAD 0.1039
MSD 0.0173
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Say
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = -0.00101870 + 0.0167579*t - 0.000222420*t**2
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B. Risk – Return characteristics of ADRs  
 
Although the ADRs are a derivative of underlying equity, yet there exists a 
significant difference in the ADR prices compared to the price of underlying equity (i.e. 
the ADR premium). We look to understand the movements of ADR prices, vis-à-vis the 
underlying equity, the S&P 500 (where the ADRs trade),  and the Indian stock market i.e. 
the Bombay Sensex (where the underlying equity trade). Towards this end, we conduct a 
correlation and regression analysis of ADR returns versus underlying equity returns, S&P 
500 returns and Sensex returns. This would, to some extent, explain the movements in 
ADR premiums over time, by exhibiting the impact of US stock market movements, 
Indian stock market movements, and underlying equity price changes, on the ADR 
premiums. In this way, it would help us understand the relative sensitivity of ADRs to US 
stock markets versus the Indian stock markets, which may cause some divergence in 
prices of ADR and the underlying equity (i.e. the ADR premiums) 
 
To gain further insight into price movements of ADRs and Indian equity (which 
would to an extent, explain the movement in ADR premium), we conducted simple 
regression analyses of ADR returns, separately with Indian equity returns (adjusted for 
currency movements and ADR:Equity ratios), with S&P 500 Index returns and with 
Bombay Sensex index returns. This analysis has been conducted specifically for the 
period June 2004 to December 2005, when we have seen considerably decline in the 
ADR premiums. 
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Exhibit II e
ADR Name
S&P 500 Sensex Underlying Equity S&P 500 Sensex 
Underlying 
Equity S&P 500 Sensex 
Underlying 
Equity
Higher 
Correlation 
with
Correlation of 
less than 30% 
with underlying
Dr Reddy's 5.67 7.79 12.68 7.5% 13.6% 29.5% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex Yes
HDFC Bank 5.54 7.2 8.39 7.1% 11.9% 15.5% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex Yes
ICICI Bank 7.68 7.22 9.2 12.9% 11.9% 18.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% S&P 500 Yes
Infosys Technologies 7.53 5.94 7.57 12.4% 8.4% 13.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% S&P 500 Yes
MTNL 4.28 4.34 9.6 4.4% 4.7% 19.3% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex Yes
Ranbaxy Labs 0.67 7.66 24.92 0.1% 13.2% 62.2% 50.40% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex No
Reliance Industries 2.03 15.81 29.62 1.0% 39.2% 69.9% 4.30% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex No
Satyam Computers 8.33 6.07 8.24 14.8% 8.7% 15.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% S&P 500 Yes
State Bank of India 0.87 12.14 17.19 0.2% 27.6% 43.9% 38.70% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex No
Tata Motors 3.11 13.62 23.05 3.0% 38.0% 63.8% 0.20% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex No
Wipro 7.09 8.17 9.67 11.2% 14.8% 19.5% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex Yes
Average 5.32       9.33        13.96             7.8% 19.3% 33.6%
Bombay Sensex 1.21 0.4% 22.70%
T-Statistic versus R2 (Correlation) with P-value
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Exhibit II e contd.
ADR Name
S&P 500 Sensex Underlying Equity
Dr Reddy's 0.67       0.59        0.48               
HDFC Bank 0.81       0.67        0.44               
ICICI Bank 1.16       0.72        0.45               
Infosys Technologies 1.11       0.59        0.44               
MTNL 0.74       0.49        0.46               
Ranbaxy Labs 0.10       0.68        0.77               
Reliance Industries 0.28       1.11        0.92               
Satyam Computers 1.33       0.65        0.43               
State Bank of India 0.12       0.95        0.62               
Tata Motors 0.53       1.20        0.79               
Wipro 1.10       0.82        0.49               
Average 0.79       0.81        0.56               
Bombay Sensex 0.10       
Beta versus
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Exhibit II f
28-May-04 31-Dec-05
Change in 
S&P and 
ADR prices
28-May-04 31-Dec-05 28-May-04 31-Dec-05
Change 
in Sensex 
and 
Indian 
Equity
Difference 
in Price 
change
28-May-04 31-Dec-05 ∆ ADR Premium
$ $ Rs Rs 45.465 45.195
S&P 500 1,120.68                      1,248.29    11%
Sensex 4759.62 9397.93 104.69 207.94 99% 87%
RDY 18.52                           21.60         17% 887.55        978.50       19.52 21.65 11% -6% -5.1% -0.2% 4.9%
HDB 28.32                           50.90         80% 369.75        707.45       8.13 15.65 92% 12% 16.1% 8.4% -7.7%
IBN 12.87                           28.80         124% 246.35        584.70       5.42 12.94 139% 14% 18.8% 11.3% -7.5%
INFY 41.38                           80.86         95% 1,264.21     2,996.75    27.81 66.31 138% 42% 48.8% 21.9% -26.8%
MTE 5.83                             6.90           18% 111.70        144.20       2.46 3.19 30% 11% 18.6% 8.1% -10.5%
RBXD 10.88                           7.99           -27% 494.90        362.35       10.89 8.02 -26% 0% -0.1% -0.3% -0.2%
RIGD 21.35                           37.55         76% 331.57        684.34       7.29 15.14 108% 31% 46.4% 24.0% -22.4%
SAY 19.54                           36.59         87% 305.05        737.80       6.71 16.32 143% 55% 45.6% 12.1% -33.5%
SBID 24.45                           50.50         107% 484.85        907.45       10.66 20.08 88% -19% 14.6% 25.8% 11.1%
TTM* 8.97                             14.37         60% 403.35        653.00       8.87 14.45 63% 2% 1.1% -0.5% -1.7%
WIT 7.40                             11.95         61% 250.75        463.45       5.52 10.25 86% 23% 34.2% 16.5% -17.6%
Average 64% 79% 15% -10%
* prices as on Sep 30, 2004 and Dec 31, 2005 due to lack of prior trading data
ADR PremiumAdjusted for exchange ratePrice as on Price as on
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The data in Exhibit II e indicates that the ADR prices do not move in lock-step 
with the prices of Indian equity. This is substantiated by the regression analysis that we 
have conducted on the ADR returns versus Bombay Sensex, S&P 500 and the underlying 
equity returns. We find that ADRs, on average, exhibit a lower beta with the underlying 
equity (0.56) vis-à-vis the Sensex or S&P 500 (0.80). 
 
This is a surprising result. As mentioned earlier, the ADR is a derivative of the 
underlying equity, with exactly similar risk- return characteristics as the underlying 
equity. Given this fact, we would expect a beta near to 1 for ADR returns versus returns 
on the underlying equity. However, the average beta of ADRs with the underlying equity 
is only 0.56, (much lower than the average ADR beta of 0.81 for Sensex and average 
ADR beta of 0.79 for S&P 500). Thus, not only we have a difference in valuations of 
ADRs and underlying equity (the ADR premiums), but we also have changes in ADR 
premiums over time (as evidenced by lower sensitivity of ADRs to underlying equity 
price movements). Therefore a low beta should indicate an increase in ADR premiums 
during a bear run in the Indian stock market and a decline in ADR premiums when the 
Indian stock market is on a bull run (for e.g. from June 2004 onwards). 
 
This observation is substantiated in Exhibit II f, which gives us details of price 
movement in ADRs and Indian Equity over the period, June 2004 – December 2005. 
 
In general, we observe a decline in ADR premiums over this period. All ADRs 
(except RDY and SBID) have shown decline in ADR premiums and the average decline 
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is around 10%. At the same time the S&P 500 appreciated 11% vis-à-vis 99% 
appreciation in the Bombay Sensex (Indian Stock Market), a difference of 87%. 
However, ADR prices on an average increased only 64%, versus an average 79% 
increase in the prices of underlying equity shares – reflecting a beta of < 1 with the 
underlying equity  
 
It should be mentioned here that the correlation between the Bombay Sensex and 
S&P 500 is very low (0.4%) and the beta is quite insignificant (0.10). Given this data, it 
can be safely said that US stock markets and Indian stock markets are quite uncorrelated. 
 
It is interesting to note that Satyam Computers, Infosys and ICICI Bank have 
higher correlations and betas with S&P 500 than with the Sensex, and a correlation of 
less than 30% (average 33.6%) with the underlying equity. Wipro also has a higher beta 
with S&P 500 than with the Sensex, and a correlation of less than 30% (average 33.6%) 
with the underlying equity. These stocks, thus, move more in tandem with US stock 
markets, than with Indian stock markets. Interestingly, average ADR premium for these 
stocks is 25%, much higher than the average ADR premium of 17% 
 
Regression of ADR returns versus S&P 500 is significant in all cases, except 
MTNL, State Bank of India and Ranbaxy. The correlation of ADR returns with S&P500 
is on an average 7.8% (quite low), but is relatively high for Infosys, Wipro, Satyam 
Computers and ICICI Bank. The regression of ADR returns with Bombay Sensex and the 
underlying equity is significant in all cases and the correlations of ADR returns with the 
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Bombay Sensex and the underlying equity are also higher than the S&P 500 (average 
19.3% and 33.6%, respectively), which appears consistent with market facts (i.e. the 
ADR is a derivative of underlying Indian equity that trades in Indian stock market). At 
the same time, average ADR returns’ correlation with underlying equity is higher than 
with Sensex – again a consistent result. 
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III ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK1 
In this section, we focus on laws regarding capital account transaction in India, 
including the rules and exact procedures for investment by foreign nationals in Indian 
securities market and repatriation of those funds. In order to understand whether these 
laws maybe the reason for ADR premiums, we have also investigated laws regarding 
capital account transactions in Hong Kong, Germany, and South Korea (whose ADRs do 
not carry any significant premiums at all – refer Section I) 
 
Portfolio investment is relatively straightforward in India. Even retail investors 
can trade freely via a sub-account with any registered Foreign Institutional Investor (FII). 
We find that there are virtually no restrictions on portfolio investment in Germany, Hong 
Kong and South Korea, too. Repatriation of capital, profits and dividends is also free of 
any restrictions in India, Germany, Hong Kong and South Korea. As far as these factors 
are concerned, Indian capital markets have the same structure as developed capital 
markets (like Germany) and some vibrant emerging markets (like Hong Kong and South 
Korea). 
Please refer Appendix I for details. 
There is, however a crucial difference in ADR provisions of India and these 
countries. It is possible to convert ADRs into equity shares and conversely, equity shares 
into ADRs, without restrictions, in Germany, Hong Kong and South Korea. In India, the 
rules are different. The ADRs have only “limited two way fungibility”. What this implies 
                                                 
1 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist 
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is that ADRs can be freely converted to equity shares, but equity shares in India can be 
converted to ADRs only to the extent of past conversion of ADRs in that company into 
shares. This is technically called “headroom”. If no ADR has been converted back into 
equity shares, it implies that no investor can buy shares in India and convert those shares 
into ADRs. The implication of ‘headroom’ provision is that if ADRs trade at a premium, 
it is not possible to conduct an arbitrage (i.e. short ADR and go long the Indian equity), 
because Indian equity cannot be converted into ADR (to close out the short sale), unless 
head room is available. 
 
As mentioned above, ‘headroom” is required in an ADR issue to allow arbitrage 
to happen. From my discussions with professionals in investment management, it appears 
that all the headroom has expired long time back and so conversion of local shares to 
ADR through this route is not possible right now. However, it is difficult to obtain the 
accurate and comprehensive information about “headroom” available for different ADRs, 
in terms of either current or historical data. 
 
In the absence of “headroom”, it is difficult to convert Indian equity shares into 
ADRs (due to limited fungibility). Any arbitrage by way of short selling ADRs in US and 
buying the underlying security in India seems not possible. In that, the ADR provisions 
are certainly different from a developed market like Germany and emerging markets like 
Hong Kong and South Korea. It is realistically not possible to readily convert Indian 
equity shares into ADRs listed on the US equity markets, which makes it difficult for any 
investor to take advantage of ADR premiums.  
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Given the fact that “headroom” is not available, and ADR are trading at a 
premium, it implies that the higher ADR price is caused by the following factors: 
1. Segmentation in the US and the Indian stock markets. This means that ADR and 
Indian equity are being valued differently by investors in these two separate markets. 
2. Whether or not “headroom” is available, the existence of ADR premiums can be 
explained partially by (1) liquidity premium, (2) currency risk premium, and (3) cost 
for transactions / procedural hassles. 
Section IV of the paper will investigate these questions. 
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IV INVESTIGATING ADR PREMIUMS 
 
As discussed in Section I, we now return to an investigation into the reasons that 
may be the cause of ADR premiums. The following issues will be investigated in detail to 
gain insights into the reasons causing the residual ADR premiums 
 
Liquidity Premium 
  
Given the obvious ease of investing in ADRs, there is no doubt about their 
demand in the US, especially for an increasingly attractive success story like the Indian 
economy. If ADRs offer better liquidity than the underlying equity, it can be argued that 
the ADRs would be more attractive to investors who prefer liquidity.  
 
It would be instructive to analyze the shareholding pattern of the ADRs and the 
underlying equity to investigate whether a relatively higher proportion of ADRs are 
owned by Institutional Investors (who prefer liquidity). Presuming ADRs are primarily 
held by Institutional Investors or broadly by investors who value liquidity (i.e. investors 
who trade a lot), the liquidity factor become important and may justify premiums on 
ADR prices. 
 
There are several methods that have been used in the finance literature for 
gauging illiquidity which can be roughly divided into price-based measures (like the daily 
bid-ask spread divided by daily price) and volume-based measures (like daily trading 
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volume divided by shares outstanding). We have used a measure formulated by Amihud 
(2002) for gauging liquidity of ADRs and underlying equity. Amihud’s measure 
calculates the average of daily ratio of absolute return to dollar trading volume. 
                                                                   Dt 
Specifically, Amihud’s measure =     1    Σ │Radr i,d │ 
                                                           Dt    d=1      Voladr i, d  
 
where Dt is the number of trading days in month t,  Radr i,d is the daily return of 
ADR i on day d (within month t), and  the Voladr i, d is dollar trading volume of ADR i on 
day d, defined as number of shares traded times the ADR price on day d. 
 
We use Amihud's (2002) liquidity measure for estimating the impact of liquidity 
on ADR premia. We calculated the daily Amihud measure for both the ADR and the 
underlying equity in Indian markets for the period from January 2001 to December 2005. 
The daily Amihud measure differential is then calculated in % terms in the following 
way; [Daily Amihud Measure (ADR)/Daily Amihud Measure (Indian equity) – 1]. This 
Daily Amihud Measure differential has then been used to derive monthly averages for 
each ADR from January 2001 to December 2005. Similarly we have calculated the daily 
premium at which ADRs trade in US markets (using the daily INR – USD exchange 
rate). This daily premium (in %) is then used to derive monthly average for each ADR 
over the period January 2001 to December 2005.  
 
Exhibit IV a illustrates the higher relative liquidity in 2004 for a sample of 4 
ADRs, all of which have displayed high ADR premiums over a long period of time.  
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Exhibit IV a
ADR
Average monthly Amihud 
measure (ADR) / Average 
monthly Amihud measure 
(Underlying equity)
ICICI Bank 2.89                                       
Infosys 2.29                                       
Wipro 9.83                                       
Reliance Industries 112.29                                    
This indicates that ADRs in the US markets display a higher liquidity relative to 
the underlying equity in the Indian markets. As mentioned above, liquidity carries a 
premium and ADRs may be valued more by investors who prefer liquidity. Given this, 
we explore to what extent does liquidity play a part in the existence of ADR premiums. 
 
We have, therefore, related the Monthly Amihud measure differential (an estimate 
of liquidity) to the premiums at which ADRs trade in the US markets. 
 
Therefore, we have derived a regression equation for the data for all ADRs (11 in 
number) by a bunching together the monthly Amihud measure differentials and monthly 
ADR premiums. The results are presented below 
 
Regression Analysis: ADR premium versus AM differential  
 
The regression equation is 
 
ADR pre = 0.186 + 0.000097 AM differential 
 
 
Predictor              Coef     SE Coef      T      P 
Constant           0.185659    0.007771  23.89  0.000 
AM differential  0.00009670  0.00006186   1.56  0.119 
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S = 0.175124   R-Sq = 0.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.2% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source           DF        SS       MS     F      P 
Regression        1   0.07494  0.07494  2.44  0.119 
Residual Error  578  17.72641  0.03067 
Total           579  17.80135 
 
We observe that the T- value is only 1.56 and the P-value is high at 11.9%. Also 
the R-sq is only 0.4%. Although it is well proven that liquidity commands a premium, in 
case of Indian ADRs it appears that the impact of liquidity difference between the ADRs 
and underlying equity is not a good predictor for the ADR premium. In other words, the 
results of the above regression are not statistically significant. 
 
We have also attempted similar regressions for individual ADRs viz. WIT, INFY 
and IBN. The results are not materially different from those obtained by using the 
aggregated data. 
 
A summary of results is presented Exhibit IV b (refer Appendix II for details) 
 
We also present in Exhibit IV c & d, scatter plots of the log of differential 
between the Amihud measures of ADRs and underlying equity versus the ADR 
premiums for two Indian ADRs, Infosys and Wipro. We plot the monthly data for the 
period January 2001 to December 2005. As the plots show, it is difficult to say 
conclusively that there exists a significant relationship between the illiquidity measure 
and ADR premiums. 
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Exhibit IV b
Company T-stat P-value R-sq.
Wipro 2.87 0.60% 12.40%
Infosys 0.20     
  
84.40% 0.10%
ICICI Bank 1.68 9.80% 4.70%  
Exhibit IV c
Log of Amihud Differential vs ADR premiums (INFOSYS)
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Exhibit IV d
Log of Amihud Differential vs ADR premium (Wipro)
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The above analyses lead us to conclude that liquidity is not an important factor for 
predicting the premiums of ADRs prices over the prices of underlying equity. 
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Currency Risk 
Exhibit IV e
Indian Rupee Depreciation
Year  versus USD versus GBP USD vs GBP
1996 2.1% 12.1% -8.9%
1997 9.3% 6.1% 3.0%
1998 8.2% 8.8% -0.5%
1999 2.4% -0.2% 2.6%
2000 7.3% -0.9% 8.3%
2001 3.5% 0.6% 2.9%
2002 -0.6% 9.9% -9.5%
2003 -5.1% 5.2% -9.8%
2004 -4.1% 3.9% -7.7%
2005 3.4% -7.7% 11.9%
Average 2.6% 3.8% -0.8%
Median 2.9% 4.5% 1.0%
High 9.3% 12.1% 11.9%
Low -5.1% -7.7% -9.8%
Data Source: Yahoo.co.in, www.oanda.com  
In case arbitrage is possible, any individual / corporate / institutional investor can 
invest in India freely through a sub-account with an FII, and convert it into ADR, rather 
than invest directly in a higher-priced, same-risk ADR. Any premium that exists may be 
partially due to Currency risk premium. In other words, the ADRs eliminate expected 
losses to investors due to depreciation of Indian Rupee (INR) versus USD (US Dollar). 
ADRs may trade at a premium because of this fact. 
 
Since Indian Rupee has been traditionally weak versus USD, the currency 
depreciation will partially explain higher ADR prices. Currency risk is primarily the 
expected depreciation in the Indian Rupee over and above the depreciation expected due 
to interest rate differentials. This currency risk premium should partially account for 
ADR premiums. Again, over the last 4 years, the dollar has depreciated versus rupee, not 
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entirely due to the relative strengths of US and Indian economies but primarily because of 
general weakening of USD. We, therefore, examine the currency movements of Indian 
rupee (INR) versus USD, INR versus GBP, and Euro versus INR, over last 10 years, to 
gauge “general” rupee depreciation (and hence the currency risk).  
 
Since the USD itself has depreciated on an average 0.8% versus GBP, INR 
depreciation versus GBP is a better indicator of average depreciation. Therefore, the 
actual currency risk (i.e. average depreciation expected, based on past currency 
movements) for INR is 3.8% per annum (refer Exhibit IV e). We, of course, assume here 
that (1) the average investment horizon (or holding period) for investors is 1 year, and (2) 
the currency movements of past 10 years form an appropriate basis for investor 
expectations about future currency depreciation and average depreciation of INR in the 
past is a good proxy for expected depreciation in future. 
 
Given the above, if average depreciation expected for INR is approximately 4%, 
the currency risk explains only a small portion of ADR premium. It may be mentioned 
here that ADR premium on Indian ADRs average 17% over last 5 years, which implies 
that only a small proportion of ADR premium is explained by currency risk premium. 
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Cost for transactions / procedural hassles 
 
Cost of procedural hassles is more of a subjective issue and is difficult to assign a 
value to such a variable. In any case, the cost of any procedural hassle cannot be as high 
as premiums of 17% for any rational investor. In other words, it seems unlikely that high 
ADR premiums for Indian securities can be ascribed to procedural hassles. It is important 
to note that procedural hassle is same for all securities, whereas ADR premiums vary 
greatly for different ADRs and are negative for some of them (e.g. Dr Reddy’s (RDY) 
and Tata Motors (TTM)). 
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Segmented Markets / Market Inefficiency 
 
 As we have mentioned earlier, ADRs are a pure derivative of the underlying 
equity with exactly similar cash flow and dividend rights. In other words, the risk-return 
characteristics of ADRs and underlying equity are same. Given this fact, if the prices of 
the ADR and the underlying equity still differ, it may be attributed to difference in 
investor preferences i.e. a market irrationality. In this context regard, we would like to 
mention the three comparable cases in contemporary finance that we touched upon in 
Section I (Introduction) – 
• Royal Dutch/ Shell group conundrum – From 1907 till June 2005, Royal Dutch 
Shell group was a joint venture between Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (RDP) of the 
Netherlands and the Shell Transport and Trading Company plc (STT) of UK in the ratio 
60:40. These two companies jointly owned all the operating companies in the group (and 
nothing else i.e. no other assets) and all earnings was always divided 60/40 in favor of 
Royal Dutch. However, the market prices of RDP and STT were never in the ratio of 
60:40, even though both companies had claim to exactly the same cash flows (in 60:40 
ratio), with similar risk-return characteristics. The difference in dividend policies of RDP 
and STT has been put forward as a possible reason for difference in share prices of RDP 
and STT (after adjusting for shareholding ratio in JV). However, a crucial difference here 
is that, in the case of ADRs, the dividend cash flows for ADRs and the underlying equity 
are exactly equal.  
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Exhibit IV f 
 
• The Closed End Mutual Fund puzzle – Closed end funds trade at a discount to 
their NAVs. This is a puzzle, since prima facie there is no reason why the market price 
for a closed-end fund should be different from the current value of the portfolio held by 
the fund, or its net asset value (NAV). In this regard, we analyze the closed end India 
Fund (IFN), and its price versus NAV.  Exhibit IV f shows that the India Fund has been 
trading at a discount for most of the last 10 years till mid-2005. Interestingly, the trend 
has reversed (i.e. Share Price has become greater than NAV) in the last 12 months. 
Again, the closed end IFN is a derivative of all the Indian equities that it holds in the 
Indian Stock market, so it seems irrational that the share price of IFN should be any 
different from its NAV (i.e. share prices of underlying equities). It should be mentioned 
here that the beta of IFN with S&P 500 is 1.59 versus a beta of 0.98 with the Bombay 
Sensex, which is interesting, given the fact that IFN consists of equities traded 
exclusively in the Indian stock market. However, it should be mentioned here, that, in the 
context of this paper, it is much more difficult to conduct an arbitrage between a closed 
end fund (i.e. IFN) traded in the US and the underlying equities traded in India. 
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• 3Com/Palm case – On September 13, 1999 3Com announced its intentions to take 
one of its subsidiaries, Palm Computing (a leading manufacturer of handheld devices), 
public the following year. On March 2, 2000 Palm became publicly traded on the Nasdaq 
National Market. 3Com sold a 6% stake at $38 a share which was well above the initial 
$14 to $16 range. At the time of the IPO, 3Com announced its intention to divest its 
remaining 94% ownership to 3Com shareholders within six months. On the first day of 
trading, Palm opened at $145, reaching a high of $165 before ending the day at $95.06. 
This stock price translated to a $53.4 billion value for Palm in contrast to 3Com’s $28.5 
billion value. Based on 3Com’s 94% ownership, 3Com’s stake in Palm was worth 
approximately $50 billion, giving substantial negative value to 3Com’s other assets, an 
almost perfect violation of the law of one price. 1  
 
A possible explanation for this anomaly has been the restrictions on arbitrage i.e. 
short selling Palm (and going long 3Com), due to a very small number of Palm shares 
available in the market. This effectively made arbitrage very difficult. In context of this 
paper, it is worth stating that although Palm was a part of 3Com but did not share the 
risk-return characteristics of 3Com in entirety (unlike ADR-underlying equity 
combination) 
 
Further, since 3Com had announced its intention to divest Palm completely within 
six months, the arbitrage had to necessarily go away at the time of divestment i.e. 3Com 
                                                 
1 “The Valuation and Market Rationality of Internet Stock Prices” – Ofek & Richardson, 2001 
“The Parent Company Puzzle – When is the whole less than one of its parts?” – Cornell & Liu, 2000 
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and Palm share prices (adjusted for share exchange ratio) had to converge. In contrast, in 
case of ADRs, there is no event (like divestment / merger) that would necessarily cause 
the prices of the underlying and the ADR to converge. 
 
In any case, the three cases above do provide though provoking examples of 
market inefficiencies, where securities with similar risk-return characteristics were valued 
very differently by same / different investors. Continuing this line of thought, we propose 
that a possible reason for the continued existence of ADR premiums is the difference in 
perceptions of the investors in US markets versus the investors in Indian markets. 
Although difficult to substantiate, this implies that there is a distinct dichotomy in the 
way these two markets are behaving as regards ADR premiums. Given the fact that there 
are no information asymmetries (as regards ADRs) and capital flow restrictions, it seems 
difficult that segmentation of markets may be a possible cause of ADR premiums. 
However, as we discussed in Section III, the absence of sufficient “headroom” is causing 
significant barriers to arbitrage and a veritable impediment to free flow of capital i.e. a 
segmentation of US and Indian stock markets. In the absence of sufficient “headroom”, 
arbitrage between the higher ADR prices and lower underlying equity prices seems quite 
difficult, which has allowed the ADR premiums (i.e. a market inefficiency) to persist for 
a long time. The magnitude of ADR premiums and the high correlations of certain ADRs 
(with relatively higher premiums) to S&P 500 seem to indicate the difference in investor 
expectations in US and India as a possible cause of ADR premiums. 
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V  EPILOGUE 
Current Data 
February 1 (Bloomberg) -- The following table of American and global depositary receipts of
Indian companies compares their closing prices with the most recent closes in local
trading. Price adjustments are based on a currency value of 44.12 rupee per dollar, along
with the number of shares per ADR or GDR. 
 
*T 
                     ADR/GDR                  Local     Local  ADR/GDR  Shares/ 
Company              Ticker  Close  % Chg    Equiv.     Close   % Prem   ADR/GDR 
Dr Reddy's           RDY     25.60  +0.24  1,129.42  1,119.60    +0.88       1.0  
HDFC Bank            HDB     59.44  +4.56    874.12    762.55   +14.63       3.0 
ICICI Bank           IBN     31.42  +0.03    693.09    609.15   +13.78       2.0 
Infosys Technologies INFY    76.22  +1.09  3,362.67  2,879.70   +16.77       1.0 
MTNL                 MTE      7.36  -0.68    162.35    141.70   +14.58       2.0 
Ranbaxy Labs         RBXD     9.23  +0.87    407.21    399.10    +2.03       1.0 
Reliance Industries  RIGD    33.50  +0.66    738.98    713.70    +3.54       2.0 
Satyam Computers     SAY     39.20  -0.73    864.71    746.65   +15.81       2.0 
State Bank of India  SBID    46.17  -3.41  1,018.46    886.80   +14.85       2.0 
Tata Motors          TTM     16.06  +2.23    708.54    709.30    -0.11       1.0 
Wipro                WIT     14.85  +1.23    655.15    529.90   +23.64       1.0 
 
The ADR premiums have declined further since July 2005 (when we initiated the 
research). For Infosys itself the premium is down from 39% to 16.7% currently. Given 
the fact that INFY ADR premium has been, on an average 50% in last 5 years, and was as 
high as 39% in July 2005, a decline of 23% is phenomenal indeed. Other ADRs that have 
experienced similar trend (though not as spectacular) are RIGD (average - 37%, current – 
4%), SAY (average - 23%, current – 16%) and SBID (average - 22%, current – 15%). 
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The average ADR premium is down to 11% now, which is a significant decline. 
Even though real arbitrage seems difficult in case of Indian ADRs, it is possible for 
investors to short the ADRs in US, go long the Indian equity and invest the difference in 
risk-free securities. Since the correlation between ADRs and underlying equity is over 
90%, the equity risk is somewhat hedged in such a transaction (even though the beta of 
ADR for underlying equity is 0.56). Also, ADR premium should more than compensate 
investors for the hedging cost of currency risk. The balance amount is, of course, “quasi” 
- arbitrage profit. Of course, such a transaction is predicated on the investors receiving 
the proceeds of short sale and borrowing costs (of ADRs short sold) being minimal. 
 
Summary  
 
We summarize the results of our analyses with the following observations. 
 
Premiums on ADRs of Indian companies have been in existence for some time 
(around 5 years, starting 1999 till date), and the phenomenon is unique to Indian ADRs, 
vis-à-vis ADRs from other countries.  Although, the ADR premiums have been trending 
down for some time lately, the average premium was still around 16% in 2005. The 
ADRs returns appear to be more sensitive to US stock markets, than the Indian stock 
markets and the underlying equity. More interestingly, the ADR prices do not move in 
lock-step with the prices of underlying equity, despite sharing exactly the same risk-
return characteristics.  
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Certain institutional framework issues (viz. insufficient “headroom”) have had a 
substantial impact on the existence ADR premiums, in that these issues make it difficult 
for investors to take advantage of ADR premiums via arbitrage. Our research indicates 
that the impact of liquidity and currency risk premium on ADR premiums is relatively 
insignificant. A possible reason (though not conclusive) for such premiums does appear 
to be segmented markets, which does indicate market inefficiency, to a degree. In this 
context, we compare the phenomenon of ADR premiums to the Royal Dutch / Shell share 
prices, the Closed End fund puzzle, and the 3Com-Palm case. In all the three cases, 
securities with similar risk-return characteristics were valued differently by investors. 
 
Further, the fact that ADR premiums are declining can have the following 
possible analyses: 
 
(1) Arbitrageurs have been able to effect quasi-arbitrage, which enables them to 
circumvent the barriers to arbitrage in institutional framework (described in Section 
III), and /or 
 
(2) The market inefficiency is being corrected gradually, or the segmented market 
hypothesis is being eliminated as investor expectation finally converge in US and 
Indian markets. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Description1 India Hong Kong2 Germany South Korea 
Portfolio 
Investment 
Foreign institutional 
investors (FIIs) may invest 
directly in all securities 
traded on the primary and 
secondary markets in India, 
subject to certain caps 
No specific restrictions 
apply to portfolio 
investment, and foreign 
investors may place funds 
directly in the stock and 
bond markets. 
No obstacles exist to 
raising and moving capital 
in Germany. 
Markets totally 
liberalized since 1997 
crises. Even unlisted 
stocks and derivatives 
available for unlimited 
foreign investment. No 
individual or aggregate 
ceilings exist. 
                                                 
1 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist 
2 The underlying stock for ADRs of Chinese shares on the US stock exchanges are the shares of Chinese companies listed on Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (called ‘H’ shares). These shares have been issued primarily for foreign investors, trade at a lower PE compared to shares listed on the 
Chinese Stock Exchanges (called ‘A’ & ‘B’ shares) and are subject to securities markets rules of Hong Kong. 
 
2 
Repatriation of 
Capital 
Repatriation of portfolio 
investments is permitted on 
the same terms to all 
classes of non-resident 
investors. Under the 
Foreign Exchange 
Management Act, for 
portfolio investments made 
in secondary markets, 
repatriation of capital is 
allowed freely.  
 
No restriction on the 
amount of local currency or 
foreign currency that can 
be brought into or taken out 
of Hong Kong. 
No restrictions or special 
regulations apply. 
Free repatriation of 
approved capital is 
guaranteed by law. Ex 
post facto reporting 
rules apply. Legitimacy 
of origins must be 
confirmed by remitting 
forex bank. 
Repatriation of 
Profits/ Dividends 
All foreign banks, 
companies and project 
offices can remit profits 
and dividends without 
permission from the 
Reserve Bank of India. 
No restrictions on payment 
of dividends or other 
distributions to overseas or 
foreign shareholders. 
No restrictions or special 
regulations apply. 
Same as repatriation of 
capital. New legislation 
makes it for foreign 
funds difficult to avoid 
tax on capital gains. 
3 
ADR provisions No approval required from 
Government for fresh ADR 
issue; only intimation 
within 30 days is required. 
Only limited fungibility of 
ADRs is allowed. 
No restrictions are imposed 
on listed companies’ 
issuance of GDRs or 
ADRs. 
There is no government-
imposed cap on GDR or 
ADR issuance. 
Listed firms have been 
allowed to issue 
overseas securities in 
unlimited amounts 
since 1998. No special 
restrictions 
* We include ADRs of Chinese shares listed on Hong Stock Exchange in our dataset. Therefore, we have analyzed the institutional framework in 
Hong Kong (and not China) in this report.
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India1 
 
Portfolio Investment 
 
FIIs include pension funds, mutual funds, investment trusts, insurance or re-
insurance companies, asset-management companies, incorporated institutional portfolio 
managers, university funds, endowments, foundations and charitable trusts/societies with a 
track record. Secondary stock market operations are permitted only through registered 
intermediaries on the Indian stock exchanges. FIIs are permitted to lend their securities 
through an approved intermediary.  
 
Portfolio investments are subject to an aggregate ceiling of 24% of paid-up equity 
capital in one company for registered FIIs and sub-accounts, with a sub-ceiling of 10% for 
any one FII. Indian companies can increase this 24% limit up to the FDI cap in the relevant 
sector, provided the company’s board of directors approves the move and the general body 
of the corporation passes a resolution allowing it. Investments by FIIs through offshore 
single/regional funds, Global Depositary Receipts, American Depositary Receipts and 
euro-convertibles are not counted towards FII limits. 
 
                                                 
1 Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist 
 
5 
FIIs that are asset-management companies, investment advisers, nominee 
companies, institutional portfolio managers, trustees, power-of-attorney holders or banks 
may invest on behalf of sub-accounts. A sub-account can be a foreign company or 
individual, an institution, fund or portfolio established outside India. In the case of a fund 
or portfolio, it must be “broad-based”, meaning that it should have at least 20 investors, 
with no single individual investor holding more than 10% of its shares or units. The 
registration process for sub-accounts is simpler: FIIs need only submit details of sub-
accounts, an undertaking and a registration fee of US$1,000. The SEBI registers them 
within three working days. 
 
Repatriation of capital 
 
Repatriation of capital is permitted for any class of foreign investor, including non-
resident Indians (NRIs) and foreign institutional investors (FIIs), if the original capital was 
remitted from abroad in foreign currency and if the equity has been sold on a stock 
exchange.  
 
This therefore excludes investments in partnerships, which are not listed. However, 
NRIs can invest in partnership firms on a repatriation basis with government approval. 
Repatriation of portfolio investments is permitted on the same terms to all classes of non-
resident investors. Under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, for portfolio investments 
made in secondary markets, repatriation of capital is allowed freely.  
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ADR provisions 
 
From 2000 onwards, companies no longer require approval from the Ministry of 
Finance for overseas issues, but should inform both the ministry and the exchange-control 
department of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) within 30 days of the issue. This rule 
applies to companies issuing ADRs/GDRs for the first time and those issuing a fresh set of 
ADRs/GDRs, provided that they issue new equity shares to support the offering and 
expand their capital bases. This automatic route also applies to the issue of employee stock 
options in the form of ADRs/GDRs by Indian software and other IT companies. 
 
In February 2002 the RBI permitted limited two-way fungibility of ADRs/GDRs, 
meaning that ADRs or GDRs that have been converted into local shares can be converted 
back into ADRs or GDRs. This applies only to re-conversions. In November 2002 the RBI 
allowed Indian companies to sponsor ADR/GDR issues with overseas depositories against 
the shares held by their shareholders. In February 2003 it further said that resident 
shareholders that offer their shares for such conversions could receive the proceeds in 
foreign currency. 
 
As per limited fungibility, any broker can convert shares to ADR but only to the 
extent of past conversion of ADRs in that company into shares. This is called ‘Headroom’. 
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So up to the point that headroom is not fully utilized, anybody can buy in local market and 
convert to ADR and pocket the profit.  
 
The other way to convert local shares to ADRs is very cumbersome and time 
consuming. This also requires regulatory permission. Also, the company has to pass a 
special resolution and appoint a merchant banker and make sure that an opportunity is 
given to all the shareholders to participate in this process.  
Hong Kong1 
 
Hong Kong, subject to Chinese sovereignty but not its legal jurisdiction, has been 
good source of funds for companies in mainland China. More than 150 mainland 
companies were listed there in July 2005. The China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) must examine and approve companies that intend to issue Hong Kong–listed H-
shares. Furthermore, they need to bring their articles of association and their activities into 
conformance with the provisions of the Company Law, in addition to the necessary clauses 
for the articles of association of companies to be listed in Hong Kong. 
 
ADR provisions 
 
                                                 
1 Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist 
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As per regulations, the depositary banks can create ADRs if investor(s) deliver H 
shares along with payment of applicable issuance fees/ taxes/ other charges. Additionally, 
investors are entitled to present ADRs to depositary bank for cancellation and then receive 
corresponding number of underlying shares, on payment of applicable cancellation fees/ 
taxes/ other charges. 
Germany1 
 
Portfolio Investments 
 
Foreign corporations and non-residents are free to acquire securities of any 
maturity. These include German stocks, bonds, money-market instruments or any other 
portfolio instruments. There is substantial liquidity in government bonds, Pfandbriefe 
(asset-backed, particularly mortgage bonds), and blue-chip stocks, and a growing interest in 
corporate bonds, too. 
 
South Korea2 
 
Portfolio investment 
 
                                                 
1 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist 
2 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist 
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Foreign portfolio investment is governed by the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act 
and the Securities and Exchange Act. Foreign portfolio investment began with the opening 
of the country’s equity market in 1992. Bonds and money-market instruments were off 
limits to foreign investors until late 1997. The closed markets were due to apprehensions 
regarding the large gap between prevailing international and domestic interest rates (once 
more than 5 percentage points above US Treasuries) which could have caused a flood of 
“hot” money. 
The financial crisis of 1997 completely changed the scenario and during 1998–99, 
foreign portfolio investment in local stocks, bonds and money-market instruments was 
almost completely liberalized, as follows: 
• Since December 1997 foreign investors have been allowed to invest in listed public and 
corporate bonds without restrictions. 
• Since May 1998 the money market has been completely opened up to foreign investment, 
with certificates of deposit, repurchase agreements and other instruments freely traded for 
foreign investors’ accounts. (Commercial paper and trade bills became available in 
February 1998.) 
• Since May 1998 foreign investment in stocks listed on the Korea Stock Exchange and the 
Kosdaq market (both of which are now part of the Korea Exchange) has been fully 
liberalized, with no individual or aggregate ceilings. Futures and options are also freely 
available, and foreigners can also subscribe to rights issues. 
• In July 1999 unlisted stocks and bonds became available for unlimited foreign investment. 
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Foreign portfolio investors can also invest in stock or bond investment trusts and 
mutual funds. A purchase of a stake of less than 10% in a South Korean company by a non-
resident investor must be reported to a relevant forex bank. If it involves a stock swap 
(listed stocks only), then the Bank of Korea must be notified. 
Repatriation of capital 
Free repatriation of approved capital is guaranteed by law. No restrictions or 
requirements exist for reinvestment of profits. However, the forex bank that transfers 
repatriated capital must confirm the legitimacy of its origins. All remittances must be made 
from the same account at a designated forex bank, a rule that also applies to personal 
remittances. Ex post facto reporting rules set by the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act 
apply.  
Remittance of dividends and profits 
Free remittance of dividends and profits is guaranteed by law. However, forex banks 
conducting business with the foreign investors must verify the legitimacy of such 
remittances. Ex post facto reporting rules set by the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act 
apply. 
New legislation is making it more difficult for foreign funds—most notably US 
investment funds—operating from tax-haven outposts around the world to take profits out 
of South Korea in tax-free dollars under the conventional protection of bilateral tax treaties. 
A new special provision written into the existing Law for the Co-ordination of International 
Tax Affairs allows the National Tax Service (NTS) to levy local withholding taxes on 
11 
dividends, interest, and capital gains collected by foreign funds registered in some tax-
haven jurisdictions, irrespective of any bilateral tax treaties that permit tax-free repatriation 
of profits. The measure, included in South Korea's annual tax-reform package effective in 
January 2006, should affect the operations of private-equity funds and other investment 
funds doing business in South Korea.  
GDRs/ADRs provisions 
Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs) and American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are 
available and are a popular source of overseas funds for South Korean firms. GDRs/ADRs 
issued by blue-chip companies such as POSCO, Korea Electric Power, Samsung 
Electronics, Hyundai Motor and KB (Kookmin Bank) are traded on exchanges in New 
York, London and Luxembourg.  
Listed firms have been allowed to issue overseas securities in unlimited amounts 
since 1998, and practically all remaining restrictions on GDR/ADR issues (such as 
minimum dividend pay-outs) disappeared in that year. Companies seeking to issue 
GDRs/ADRs based on their own shares bought back from shareholders can do so 
immediately after they complete the buyback program. GDRs/ADRs can be issued in 
private placements. Since 2001, companies have been able to offer GDRs/ADRs at a 
discount larger than the official limit of 30%, with approval from the Financial Supervisory 
Commission. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Regression Analysis: Wip D (ADR premium)  versus Wip A (Amihud measure 
differential) 
 
The regression equation is 
Wip D = 0.184 - 0.000555 Wip A 
 
 
Predictor        Coef    SE Coef      T      P 
Constant      0.18441    0.01984   9.29  0.000 
Wip A      -0.0005547  0.0001934  -2.87  0.006 
 
 
S = 0.142236   R-Sq = 12.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 10.9% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF       SS       MS     F      P 
Regression       1  0.16641  0.16641  8.23  0.006 
Residual Error  58  1.17341  0.02023 
Total           59  1.33982 
 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  Wip A    Wip D      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  7    506  -0.0200  -0.0965  0.0923    0.0765      0.71 X 
  8    317   0.0200   0.0083  0.0569    0.0117      0.09 X 
 10    450   0.0200  -0.0650  0.0815    0.0850      0.73 X 
 46      0   0.5100   0.1843  0.0198    0.3257      2.31R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large 
influence. 
 
  
Regression Analysis: Infy D (ADR premium) versus Infy A (Amihud measure 
differential) 
 
The regression equation is 
Infy D = 0.498 - 0.000012 Infy A 
 
 
Predictor         Coef     SE Coef      T      P 
Constant       0.49758     0.01578  31.53  0.000 
Infy A     -0.00001216  0.00006152  -0.20  0.844 
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S = 0.120107   R-Sq = 0.1%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.0% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF       SS       MS     F      P 
Regression       1  0.00056  0.00056  0.04  0.844 
Residual Error  58  0.83670  0.01443 
Total           59  0.83726 
 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  Infy A  Infy D     Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
 23      29  0.7600  0.4972  0.0155    0.2628      2.21R 
 25    1977  0.4400  0.4735  0.1197   -0.0335     -3.38RX 
 58      -0  0.2300  0.4976  0.0158   -0.2676     -2.25R 
 59       0  0.2400  0.4976  0.0158   -0.2576     -2.16R 
 60       0  0.2200  0.4976  0.0158   -0.2776     -2.33R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large 
influence. 
 
  
Regression Analysis: IBN d (ADR premium) versus IBN A (Amihud measure 
differential) 
 
The regression equation is 
IBN d = 0.123 - 0.000280 IBN A 
 
 
Predictor        Coef    SE Coef      T      P 
Constant      0.12327    0.01044  11.81  0.000 
IBN A      -0.0002799  0.0001663  -1.68  0.098 
 
 
S = 0.0758329   R-Sq = 4.7%   R-Sq(adj) = 3.0% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF        SS        MS     F      P 
Regression       1  0.016282  0.016282  2.83  0.098 
Residual Error  58  0.333537  0.005751 
Total           59  0.349818 
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Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  IBN A     IBN d      Fit   SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  4      7  -0.04000  0.12135  0.01010  -0.16135     -2.15R 
  6    177  -0.03000  0.07369  0.02763  -0.10369     -1.47 X 
  7     -0  -0.04000  0.12337  0.01046  -0.16337     -2.18R 
  9     13  -0.05000  0.11975  0.00991  -0.16975     -2.26R 
 21    413   0.05000  0.00763  0.06583   0.04237      1.13 X 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large 
influence. 
 
15 
APPENDIX III 
 
Trend Analysis of ADR premiums over 2001-2005 
 
Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (RDY) 
 
Month
R
dy
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 597.593
MAD 0.026
MSD 0.002
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Rdy
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = 0.0696966 - 0.00317328*t + 0.0000433591*t**2
 
 
 
 
HDFC Bank (HDB) 
 
Month
H
db
MarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 103.155
MAD 0.046
MSD 0.004
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Hdb
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = -0.0155686 + 0.0111006*t - 0.000164012*t**2
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MTNL (MTE) 
 
Month
M
te
MarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 415.946
MAD 0.058
MSD 0.004
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Mte
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = -0.00682200 + 0.00291155*t + 0.0000244050*t**2
 
 
Reliance Industries (RIGD) 
 
Month
R
ig
d
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 12.6265
MAD 0.0484
MSD 0.0042
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Rigd
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = 0.341996 + 0.00454419*t - 0.0000876593*t**2
 
Ranbaxy Lab (RBXD) 
 
Month
R
bd
x
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 95.9661
MAD 0.0210
MSD 0.0007
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Rbdx
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = 0.146430 - 0.00297914*t + 7.761780E-06*t**2
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SBI (SBID) 
 
Month
Sb
id
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 41.3994
MAD 0.0673
MSD 0.0070
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Sbid
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = 0.0138131 + 0.0159891*t - 0.000220665*t**2
 
Wipro (WIT) 
 
Month
W
it
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 372.573
MAD 0.078
MSD 0.009
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Wit
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = -0.0661807 + 0.00954301*t - 0.0000460656*t**2
 
 
Tata Motors (TTM) 
 
Month
Tt
m
MayMarJanNovSepJulMayMar
0.025
0.020
0.015
0.010
0.005
0.000
-0.005
-0.010
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 187.288
MAD 0.004
MSD 0.000
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Ttm
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = 0.0239674 - 0.00521969*t + 0.000233497*t**2
 
